Does the problem of evil disprove the existence of God?

The problem of evil challenges the idea of an all-powerful and benevolent God. Philosophers argue that suffering may serve deeper metaphysical or moral purposes.

Is morality possible without God?

Some philosophers argue that morality arises from reason and human flourishing, while others believe it ultimately requires a transcendent foundation.

Can reason prove the existence of God?

Classical philosophers proposed arguments such as the cosmological and moral arguments to support belief in God, though critics debate whether these provide proof or philosophical justification.

The Problem of Illusion | Tawhid vs. Advaita Vedanta

Al-Ghazālī: We now arrive at a concept that carries much of the weight of your system: Maya. You have described the world as an appearance—neither fully real nor fully unreal. Let us examine this carefully. If the world is an illusion, we must ask: what is the nature of this illusion? And how does it arise?

Adi Shankaracharya: Maya is not a second reality. It is not something that exists independently of Brahman. Rather, it is the power of appearance through which the One appears as many. It is beginningless ignorance (avidyā), and it persists only so long as true knowledge has not arisen. When knowledge dawns, Maya loses its hold, and the illusion vanishes.

Ibn Sina (Avicenna): Let us consider the nature of illusion as we encounter it. When a man mistakes a rope for a snake, the snake is not real—but the experience of seeing it is real. It occurs in a real subject, under real conditions, based on a real substrate. Illusion does not arise in nothing. It depends on something real.

Adi Shankaracharya: We agree. The illusion depends on a substrate. In this case, the rope. Likewise, the world depends on Brahman. The appearance does not exist independently; it is superimposed (adhyāsa) upon the real.

Ibn Rushd (Averroes): But the analogy reveals more than you intend. In the rope-snake case, there are three distinct elements: the real rope, the perceiving subject, and the mistaken cognition. The illusion is not self-standing; it is an error occurring within a real cognitive framework. If we extend this analogy to the entire universe, we must ask: who is the subject undergoing the illusion?

Adi Shankaracharya: The individual self—the jīva—under the influence of ignorance.

Ibn Sina: And what is the true nature of this jīva?

Adi Shankaracharya: Ultimately, it is none other than Brahman itself.

Ibn Sina (Avicenna): Then we arrive at a dilemma. If the individual self is ultimately Brahman, and the illusion occurs in the individual self, then the illusion must, in some sense, be rooted in Brahman. But Brahman, as you describe it, is pure, perfect, and free from ignorance. How, then, can ignorance arise at all? Either ignorance belongs to Brahman, which compromises its perfection, or it belongs to something other than Brahman, which compromises non-duality.

Adi Shankaracharya: Ignorance cannot be attributed to Brahman in its true nature. It belongs only to the empirical standpoint. From the ultimate perspective (paramārthika), no ignorance exists. From the empirical perspective (vyavahārika), it appears. The distinction resolves the difficulty.

Al-Ghazālī: Or it relocates it. For even if we grant these levels, the question remains: what is the ontological status of this ignorance? If it exists—even at a lower level—then it must be accounted for. If it does not exist, then it cannot produce the appearance of a world. To say it is “indefinable” does not remove the need for explanation.

Ibn Rushd: Indeed. The introduction of levels of reality may describe our experience, but it does not resolve the underlying issue. The empirical world exhibits order, causation, and continuity. These are not characteristics of random illusion. They resemble a structured reality that calls for a coherent cause.

Adi Shankaracharya: The structure you observe belongs to the realm of appearance itself. Just as a dream may exhibit coherence while it lasts, so too does the waking world. The consistency does not grant it ultimate reality.

Ibn Sina: Yet even a dream requires a real mind in which it occurs. The dream does not explain itself. Likewise, if the universe is dream-like, it still requires a ground. The question persists: what is the reality in which this appearance is taking place?

Adi Shankaracharya: That reality is Brahman. The appearance does not stand apart from it.

Ibn Sina: But then we return to the same difficulty. If Brahman is the ground, and the appearance occurs upon it, then the appearance must be related to Brahman in some way. If it is related, it cannot be entirely dismissed. If it is unrelated, it cannot appear at all.

Al-Ghazālī: This is the crux of the matter. Illusion, by its very nature, presupposes a reality in which it occurs. It cannot be self-sustaining. A system that explains the world as an illusion must still explain the existence of the illusion itself. Otherwise, it risks explaining one mystery by introducing another.

Adi Shankaracharya: Or perhaps it reveals that the demand for ultimate explanation arises from within the illusion. When knowledge dawns, the need for explanation falls away, just as the need to explain the snake disappears when the rope is seen clearly.

Ibn Rushd: Yet philosophy cannot proceed by waiting for the illusion to dissolve. It must account for what is given to us now. And what is given is a world that exists, that is intelligible, and that demands explanation.

Al-Ghazālī: Then we stand at a decisive point. One path accepts the world as a contingent reality requiring a necessary source. The other treats it as an appearance whose ultimate explanation lies beyond reason. The question before us now is: which path preserves clarity without contradiction?

Let us now hear the strongest case in defense of non-duality itself.