Does the problem of evil disprove the existence of God?

The problem of evil challenges the idea of an all-powerful and benevolent God. Philosophers argue that suffering may serve deeper metaphysical or moral purposes.

Is morality possible without God?

Some philosophers argue that morality arises from reason and human flourishing, while others believe it ultimately requires a transcendent foundation.

Can reason prove the existence of God?

Classical philosophers proposed arguments such as the cosmological and moral arguments to support belief in God, though critics debate whether these provide proof or philosophical justification.

The Ground of Reality | Tawhid vs. Advaita Vedanta

Ibn Sina (Avicenna): Let us proceed with careful reasoning. We observe that everything within the world is contingent—it exists, but it does not have to exist. A tree may grow or fail to grow. A human may live or die. Even the universe, taken as a whole, does not contain within itself the necessity for its own existence. It could have been otherwise, or not at all. Therefore, its existence must be explained by something beyond it.

Adi Shankaracharya: You describe contingency as though it were ultimate. We would say that what you call contingency belongs only to the realm of appearance—vyavahārika. The world is experienced, yes, but its independent reality is not established. It is dependent upon Brahman, just as a reflection depends upon a mirror. The reflection appears, yet it has no existence apart from its source.

Ibn Rushd (Averroes): But even a reflection must be accounted for. It requires a mirror, a light source, and an observer. The fact that something depends on another does not render it unreal—it renders it contingent. The philosophical task is to explain this dependence, not to dismiss it as mere appearance.

Al-Ghazālī: Indeed. If we say that the world is an appearance, we must still ask: why does this appearance occur? What sustains it? What explains its order, its consistency, its intelligibility? An illusion that behaves with perfect regularity begins to resemble something more than illusion. It demands explanation.

Adi Shankaracharya: The explanation lies in Maya—the power of appearance. It is not a second reality, nor an independent principle. It is beginningless ignorance (avidyā) through which the One appears as many. Just as a dream presents a world that seems coherent while it lasts, so too does this waking world appear real until true knowledge arises.

Ibn Sina (Avicenna): The analogy of the dream is frequently invoked, yet it conceals a crucial point. A dream does not occur in nothing. It occurs within a real mind. The images are false, but the experience itself is real, and it depends on an underlying subject. Likewise, if the world is an appearance, it must still appear to something, and this appearance must have a basis. To call it “Maya” does not explain it; it merely names the phenomenon. Philosophy demands more than naming—it demands grounding.

Adi Shankaracharya: The ground is Brahman itself. The appearance does not stand apart from it. Just as waves arise on the surface of the ocean without altering its depth, so too does the world appear upon Brahman without affecting its true nature. Brahman remains untouched, unchanged, ever pure.

Ibn Sina: Yet this analogy introduces a difficulty. Waves are real modifications of water. If the world is like waves upon Brahman, then Brahman undergoes change. But if Brahman does not change, then the analogy fails. We must ask: is the appearance a real transformation, or not? If it is, then the Absolute is not immutable. If it is not, then the appearance lacks a clear ontological status.

Adi Shankaracharya: It is neither a real transformation nor absolute non-existence. It is anirvacanīya—indefinable. It cannot be categorized as real, for it disappears with knowledge. Nor can it be called unreal, for it is experienced. It belongs to a different order of understanding.

Ibn Rushd: But this introduces a category beyond reason. In philosophy, something must either exist, not exist, or exist through another. To introduce a fourth category—neither real nor unreal—is to suspend the very principles that make reasoning possible. If a concept cannot be defined, how can it serve as an explanation?

Al-Ghazālī: Precisely. The intellect seeks clarity, not evasion. If the world is experienced, it must possess some mode of existence. If it has a mode of existence, it must be accounted for. To say it is “indefinable” risks turning explanation into ambiguity.

Adi Shankaracharya: Or perhaps it reveals the limits of conceptual thought. Not all truths can be captured within the rigid boundaries of logic. The highest reality transcends categories. Language fails, and reason reaches its limits. The purpose of philosophy, then, is not merely to define, but to point beyond itself.

Ibn Sina: That may be so in matters of experience. But we are not yet at the level of mystical realization. We are engaged in metaphysical inquiry. And in this domain, abandoning clear categories does not elevate understanding—it dissolves it. If the foundation is unclear, the structure built upon it cannot stand.

Al-Ghazālī: Then our disagreement becomes sharper. One path accepts the limits of reason and moves beyond it. The other insists that reason must remain our guide, at least in establishing the nature of reality. The question before us now is this: can the concept of pure, non-dual consciousness be made coherent within reason itself?

Let us turn to that question directly.